Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Lorenzo J. Taylor v. Douglas E. Bagley : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Les F. England; Sutherland and England; Attorney for Respondent.
Phillip W. Dyer; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Taylor v. Bagley, No. 900454 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2859

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
t f U
DOCKET NO.

l

^CA^

^

—00—
IN THE COORT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
LORENZO J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
DOUGLAS E. BAGLEY,
*

Case No. 900454-CA
Priority 16

Defendant and Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from:

Third District Court
Salt Lake CQX
Judge
Case^ffo. 89-0905272CN

LES F. ENGLAND, ESQ.
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND
3760 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ.
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

PILED
NOV 11990
T

4^f*^j

Nchcmn

—(JOIN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
LORENZO J. TAYLOR,

*

Plaintiff and Appellant

*

vs.
*

DOUGLAS E. BAGLEY,
*

Defendant and Appellee
*

Case No. 900454-CA
Priority 16

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Appeal from:

Third District Court
Salt Lake County
Judge Dennis Frederick
Case No. 89-0905272CN

LES F. ENGLAND, ESQ.
SUTHERLAND & ENGLAND
3760 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

PHILLIP W. DYER, ESQ.
318 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AUTHORITIES

i

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

1

STATUTES, RULES AND PROVISIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ISSUES

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENTS

3

A.
THE T R I A L COURT MADE A FACTUAL
DETERMINATION AS TO THE AMBIGUITY OF THE
N O T E , AND I T S D E C I S I O N SHOULD NOT BE
DISTURBED
B.
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT WAS BETWEEN A
CORPORATION AND APPELLANT, WITH NO PERSONAL
LIABILITY TO APPELLEE
C.
JOINT
EXIST

AND SEVERAL L I A B I L I T Y

DOES NOT

THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO AMEND THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
CONCLUSION .
ADDENDUM

9
10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892,

4

(Utah 1988)
Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, (Utah 1980)

4

Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, (Utah 1980)

4

Trident Construction Company v. West Electric
Inc. 776 P.2d 1239, (Nevada 1989)
Kenneally v. First National Bank of Anoka,

5
5

400 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1968)
Bidwell v. Jolley, 716 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1986)

5

Marveon Sign Company v. Roennebeck,
694 P.2d 604 (Utah 1984)
Fidelity Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismarck
Investment Corp. 547 P.2d 212, (Utah 1976)
Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.
288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961)
Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976)

5

-i-

7
8
8

—00—
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
THE STATE OF UTAH
LORENZO J. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
*

DOUGLAS E. BAGLEY,
*

Case No. 900454-CA
*
Priority 16

Defendant and Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

I.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This matter was properly referred to the above-captioned Court
by the Supreme Court of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated <782a-3(2)(j).

1 1

•

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are two rules of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which come
under scrutiny and are applicable to these proceedings, namely Rule
15(a) and Rule 56(a) and 56(b).

Both rules are set forth in full

in the attached addendum.
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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND ISSUES
Plaintiff brought an action in the Third District Court for
collection of a promissory note.

Plaintiff asserted that the

subject note was a "joint and several" liability of Mr. Bagley and
a corporation, namely "Oncor Sound, Inc".

Plaintiff chose not to

include Oncor Sound, Inc. as a party to the action.

Mr. Bagley

defended and asserted that the subject promissory note was signed
in a corporate capacity and there was no personal liability
attached thereto. The trial court agreed with defendant's position
and dismissed the cause of action brought by plaintiff. Plaintiff
has brought the present appeal.

IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On or about November 6, 1984, plaintiff's agent/son drafted
and submitted to defendant for signature a note which contained the
signature line as follows:
Oncor Sound, Inc.
President

Mr. Bagley (appellee herein) being president of Oncor Sound,
Inc. executed the promissory note where indicated.

Almost five

years

action

later,

plaintiff/appellant

initiated

the

for

collection on the note, against Mr. Bagley personally, which action
has led to the appeal herein.
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Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the
fact that the subject note was signed solely in a corporate
capacity and there was no basis for individual liability.

The

trial court agreed with that interpretation, granted the motion for
summary judgment, and the appeal herein ensued.
Both parties agree that the underlying note is not ambiguous,
and Appellee asserts that the subject note was signed solely in a
corporate capacity, and therefore the decision of the trial court
was a proper one.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to
grant the Motion to Amend the original complaint. Appellee did not
respond to such motion and the court denied such motion on the
basis that the complaint had already been dismissed, and therefore
there was no complaint before the Court to amend. Appellant's sole
remedy to allege some alter ego theory would be to file a new,
independent action with the court.

V.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE A FACTUAL DETERMINATION
AS TO THE AMBIGUITY OF THE NOTE, AND ITS
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED

Both parties to this action have asserted throughout the
proceedings that the underlying note is not ambiguous and should
therefore be interpreted by the specific terms thereof.

Cross-

motions for summary judgment were filed with the trial court. The
trial court determined that the note was in fact not ambiguous and
3

appellant's complaint against the individual appellee must be
dismissed.
The Courts have held on numerous occasions that even though
the

parties

to

a

contract

have

a

completely

different

interpretation of certain terms or conditions of a contract, that
in and of itself, does not make a contract or the terms thereof
ambiguous.

Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892,

(Utah 1988); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, (Utah 1980); Land v.
Land, 605 P.2d 1248, (Utah 1980).
The trial court made a determination that the note was not
ambiguous and its decision is not subject to reversal by this
court.
B.

THE SUBJECT CONTRACT WAS BETWEEN A
CORPORATION AND APPELLANT, WITH
NO PERSONAL LIABILITY TO APPELLEE

Appellant has attempted to circumvent the laws of corporate
insulation by asserting that the subject contract was a "joint and
several obligation", but such assertion will not withstand scrutiny
of

the many

precedents

determined

before

it,

as

set

forth

hereafter.
It is undisputed that the terms of the contract showed Rene
Taylor, agent for Lorenzo Jones Taylor was the obligee and Oncor
Sound, Inc. was the obligor under such contract.

The name of

Douglas Bagley did not appear anywhere on the contract, until such
time as Mr. Bagley affixed his name above the printed line,
indicating "President" of Oncor Sound, Inc.
In the present matter, the only conceivable argument made by
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Appellant showing personal liability by Mr. Bagley, is that he did
not sign his name in a corporate capacity.

The failure of an

officer signing a contract, to affix his corporate title is not
fatal to the validity of a corporate contract, especially in those
instances where the contract on its face is a contract of the
corporation, and the other parties have notice of the officer's
relation to the corporation. The contract will be upheld, despite
the officer's failure to add his title.

Trident Construction

Company v. West Electric, Inc. 776 P2d. 1239, (Nevada 1989);
Kenneally v. First National Bank of Anoka, 400 F.2d 838, 841 (8th
Cir. 1968).

There can be no dispute that Mr. Bagley affixed his

name to the subject contract as president of Oncor Sound, Inc.
The Court's have gone even further in protecting individual
signators by holding that an individual acting within the scope of
authority for the corporation cannot be held personally liable upon
a contract signed by him on behalf of the corporation, so long as
notice has been given that he is acting for the corporation or the
identity of the corporation has been disclosed. Bidwell v. Jolley,
716 P.2d 481 (Colo. App. 1986). The face of the contract indicates
Oncor Sound, Inc. as the obligor. There is only one signature line
for the "President" of Oncor Sound, Inc.

There is no other

reference on the contract that an individual who signs said
contract is liable upon the terms thereof.

The monies were

received and distributed by the corporation.
In 1984 the Supreme Court of Utah was faced with a similar
factual scenario in Marveon Sign Company v. Roennebeck, 694 P.2d
5

604.

In that case an invoice was made out to "Fred Roennbeck,

Precious Coins". There was a blank signature line with the words
"authorized signature" printed below. Myrna Roennbeck, the wife of
Fred Roennebeck signed the invoice, and a suit was brought against
her personally for nonpayment of the invoice. The court held that
the printed words under the signature line implied and indicated
that she was signing only as an authorized representative of the
company and was not personally obligated. In the instant case, the
same determination has been made by the court.

Mr. Bagley signed

only in his representative capacity, and since Oncor Sound, Inc.
was not made a party to the action, the Court acted properly in
dismissing the complaint.
In

setting

forth

the

liability

of

parties,

Utah

Code

Annotated, §70A-3-403(2)(a) and 403(3) states as follows:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name
to an instrument (a) is personally obligated if the
instrument neither names the person represented nor shows
that the representative signed in a representative
capacity;
(3) Except as otherwise established, the name of an
organization preceded or followed by the name and office
of an authorized individual is a signature made in a
representative capacity.
From the foregoing it is easily discernable that the court
made the proper decision in finding that the subject contract was
a contract between Oncor Sound, Inc. and Appellant, and the
signature affixed to such contract was only as a corporate officer.
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C.

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOES
NOT EXIST

Appellant place great emphasis and reliance in the matter of
Fidelity Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bismarck Investment Corp., 547 P.2d
212, (Utah 1976), wherein the court determined that it was not
necessary to wait for the resolution of a bankruptcy to proceed
against one of the joint obligors. In Fidelity Deposit, there was
no dispute and no disagreement that joint and several liability
existed.

The dispute before the court was whether or not the

plaintiff could proceed against one of the joint obligors while the
other obligors were protected from the automatic stay provisions of
the bankruptcy court.

The present case can be distinguished from

the foregoing in that Appellee has maintained throughout that he is
not a joint obligor, and the only source of remedy available to
Appellant is to proceed against Oncor Sound, Inc.
D. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
Appellant asserts that the Court acted improperly in failing
to allow the amendment of the original complaint to add a new cause
of action against Appellee on the basis of some sort of alter ego
theory.
Appellant chose the course of action and procedures that he
determined to follow in this case.

Once the Motion for Summary

Judgment was before the Courtf there was an obligation by the Court
to make a decision upon said motion.

On April 4, 1990, Appellant

requested a decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
responded to such request and denied Appellant's Motion for Summary
7

Judgment and granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

On

April 16, 1990, almost two weeks after the requested decision for
Summary Judgment, Appellant requested a decision on the Motion to
Amend, The Court, upon receipt, determined that since the original
complaint had already been dismissed pursuant to previous Requests
for Decision,

there was no complaint before the Court to amend,

and properly denied such Motion to Amend.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a) provides that
amendment of pleadings is an affirmative policy that should be
freely given when justice so requires. Of course, the amendment of
pleadings or the allowance by the Court to do so is not a
mechanical absolute and the circumstances and terms upon which such
leave is to be "freely given" is committed to the informed, careful
judgment and discretion of the trial judge. Lone Star Motor Import,
Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Utah Supreme Court in Nichols v. State, 554 P2d. 231 (Utah
1976) held that an order of dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim for relief is a final adjudication and thereafter
plaintiff may not file an amended complaint.

The Court went on to

caution that if the moving party desired to amend their pleadings,
they should request that such an order of the Court allow an
amendment thereof.

In the instant case, the order was submitted

and signed by the Court without objection from Appellant.

In

addition, Appellant made no alternative request for decision in
their Motion for Summary Judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Appellee asserts and states
that the decision of the trial court was a proper decision, and
such decision should not be disturbed by the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .ff^day of October, 1990.

'. ENGLAND
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDUM

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 15.

AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS.

(a.) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served orf if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20 days after it is
served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent o the adverse party;
and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
RULE 56.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b)
For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.
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